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THE DUMPING OF THE NEW CARISSA: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS OF THE LONDON
CONVENTION
Jill S. Murakami
Abstract: The London Convention prohibits the dumping of hazardous materials
into the ocean. This prohibition may, however, be suspended in emergencies. The bow
of the M/V New Carissa ("New Carissa "), which contained approximately 135,000
gallons of oil, was dumped into the Pacific Ocean under the emergency provisions of the
London Convention. An analysis of the dumping of the New Carissa illustrates the
weaknesses of these provisions. As written, the provisions are ambiguous and open to
varying interpretations. As a result, nations may use the emergency provisions as
loopholes to dump substances that they would otherwise be prohibited from dumping,
thereby undermining the purpose of the Convention. Furthermore, because the London
Convention does not provide for international monitoring and enforcement, there is less
incentive for nations to comply with the Convention's dumping prohibitions and a greater
likelihood that the emergency provisions will be loosely interpreted. Left unresolved,
such weaknesses could have severe international implications. The emergency
provisions should be read restrictively in light of the precautionary policy and purpose of
the London Convention and should be clarified to ensure they are uniformly applied by
Contracting Parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 1999, the M/V New Carissa ("New Carissa ,,)l ran
aground at Coos Bay, Oregon. Over 70,000 gallons of fuel leaked into the
ocean and tar balls 2 drifted more than fifty miles north to the mouth of the
Siuslaw River. An attempt was made to bum the remaining fuel on board
in order to prevent further leaking, but in the process the vessel split in half.4
On March 11, 1999, the bow section of the New Carissa, which contained
approximately 135,000 gallons of heavy, tar-like fuel, was towed to
international waters and dumped into the Pacific Ocean.
Thirty years ago, when the ocean appeared to have an infinite capacity
as the ultimate receptacle for waste, the disposal of the New Carissa might
1 The New Carissa was a Panamanian registered 639-foot bulk carrier. John Malek & Craig Vogt,
The New Carissa Incident: Report to the London Convention 1 (1999) (on file with author).2 Tar balls are dense, black, sticky spheres of hydrocarbons formed from weathered oil. See OFFICE
OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 9200.5-105,
UNDERSTANDING OIL SPILL RESPONSE 46 (1994).
3 Steve Suo et al., Stakes Rise as Ship May Break Further Apart, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 17,
1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 5319179.
See, e.g., Malek & Vogt, supra note 1, at 2.
5 Id.
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not have made headlines. Today, however, it is known that the ocean cannot
easily assimilate many of the materials and chemicals disposed of at sea.
6
Although scientists have yet to fully determine all of the environmental
consequences of marine pollution, the potential damage caused by such
pollution is significant. Oceans are essential in sustaining life; they provide
the base for the world's fresh water supply, affect global climate, help
maintain the balance of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and
provide transportation and food to all nations.7
Over the past three decades, as a result of public exposure to marine
pollution caused by accidental oil spills and a growing number of scientific
studies on the condition of the marine environment, there has been a
growing movement to regulate and limit the dumping of wastes into the
ocean. The London Convention ("the Convention") 8 is the primary
international agreement that addresses dumping at the global level. The
Convention prohibits the dumping of certain hazardous materials into the
ocean 9 unless the dumping qualifies under an emergency exception.1 ° The
grounding of the New Carissa was deemed an emergency by the United
States Coast Guard, and the bow of the vessel was dumped under the
Convention's emergency provisions.
Although the Pacific Ocean is the world's largest body of water and is
not typically thought of as fragile, it is no less at risk of permanent harm
from human activity than any other marine region." Thus, even though
scientists predict the environmental consequences of dumping the New
Carissa12 will be minimal, 13 the bow of the New Carissa, with its 135,000
gallons of oil, is nevertheless an unwelcome addition to the Pacific. This
Comment uses the case of the New Carissa to analyze the appropriateness
and effectiveness of the London Convention's emergency provisions. Part II
6 Assimilative capacity is the extent to which the ocean can accommodate foreign inputs without
suffering unacceptable effects. William L. Lahey, Economic Charges for Environmental Protection:
Ocean Dumping Fees, II ECOLOGY L.Q. 305, 308 (1984).
7 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OCEAN
DUMPING: A NATIONAL POLICY 34 (1970) [hereinafter CEQ].
8 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, Dec.
29, 1972, [1975], 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter London
Convention].
9 Id. art. Iv. The prohibited substances are listed in Annex I of the Convention.
'o Id. art. V.
11 Lori Osmundsen, Paradise Preserved? The Contribution of the SPREP Convention to the
Environmental Welfare of the South Pacific, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 727, 729 (1992).
12 As noted in the introduction, the New Carissa split in half and the bow of the vessel was dumped.
References in this Article to the dumping of the New Carissa are to the dumping of the bow of the vessel.
See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
'
3 
See Joint Information Center, Bow of New Carissa Sinks to Resting Site, Press Release No.
086.990311 1800 (Mar. 11, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Press Release 86].
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provides background information on ocean dumping and the development of
the Convention. Part III analyzes the emergency provisions of the
Convention and dumping that has taken place under the emergency
provisions. Part IV discusses the implications of the emergency provisions
for the Pacific Rim region. Part V evaluates the New Carissa incident and
describes problems in applying the emergency provisions. Part VI proposes
that the emergency provisions should be read restrictively in light of the
precautionary policy and purpose of the Convention and should be clarified
to ensure that the provisions are uniformly applied by parties to the
Convention ("Contracting Parties").
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Growth of Ocean Dumping
The oceans have traditionally been the preferred site for the disposal
of wastes.14 Dumping wastes into the ocean is less expensive then burying
wastes on land.' 5 Moreover, because ocean dumping takes place far from
inhabited areas, the adverse effects of dumping are not readily noticeable.
6
With the increase in industrial development and the growth of the world
population in the last half-century, the quantity and concentration of wastes
dumped into the oceans have risen exponentially and have begun to threaten
our global ecosystem.' 7 In 1959 approximately 2.2 million tons of industrial
wastes were disposed of at sea.' 8 By the late 1970s 400 million tons of
wastes were dumped each year by the Convention's fifty Contracting Parties
alone.' 9 Contrary to traditional belief that the ocean is so immense that
humans can do it no harm, it has become clear that humans can produce
enough toxic waste to severely impact the ocean environment.20  It is
estimated that in the year 2030, if humans consume "at the same rate the
average citizen consumes today, [humans] will generate 400 billion tons of
solid waste every year-enough to bury greater Los Angeles 100 meters




'7 See CEQ, supra note 7, at 8.
'8 Id.
'9 Steven J. Moore, Troubles in the High Seas: A New Era in the Regulation of U.S. Ocean
Dumping, 22 ENVTL. 913, 917 (1992) (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
WASTES IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 73 (1987)).
20 S. REP. No. 451, at 9 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 4234, 4237.
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deep.' If the wastes continue to be disposed of through unregulated ocean
dumping, the environment will be severely and irreparably harmed.
B. The Effects of Ocean Dumping
As a result of increased scientific study, it is now known that ocean
dumping endangers marine life, human life, and the global ecosystem.
Marine pollution harms the environment by introducing toxic substances
into the food chain, depleting the oxygen level in the water, and altering
marine habitats.22
1. Toxic Elements in the Marine Environment
The most immediate and direct manner in which waste disposal
affects marine life and human life is by introducing toxic substances into the
food chain. Toxic pollutants dumped into the ocean enter the tissues of
marine organisms such as phytoplankton, which extract nutrients directly
from the water.23 Phyotoplankton and other organisms are vital parts of the
marine food chain. As larger forms of marine life feed on the contaminated
organisms, toxic substances become successively concentrated, leading to
high levels of concentration in predatory marine mammals, birds, and
humans.24  Furthermore, sewage sludge 25 and dredged material 26 contain
metals such as cadmium, lead, zinc, and mercury.27 In high concentrations,
these heavy metals can kill marine organisms; in low concentrations, they
28can impair sensory, reproductive, and other vital functions. Chemicalsreleased into the ocean can become concentrated in shellfish and are toxic to
21 Gregory D. Fullem, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face of
Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495, 496 (1995) (citing W. EDWARD STEAD & JEAN G.
STEAD, MANAGEMENT FOR A SMALL PLANET: STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 26
(1992)).
22 CEQ, supra note 7, at 12.
23 Lumsdaine, supra note 14, at 756 n. 17 (citing Hearings on S. 2005 Before the Subcomm. on Air &
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91" Cong. 2d Sess., 2294 (1970) (testimony by
B.H. Ketchum)).
24 Id. at 756 n.18 (citing G.M. Woodwell, Changes in the Chemistry of the Ocean: The Pattern of
Effects, in GLOBAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 186 (S.F. Singer ed., 1970)).
25 Sewage sludge is the solid material remaining after municipal wastewater treatment and is
composed of residual human wastes and other organic and inorganic wastes. See CEQ, supra note 7, at iv.
26 Dredged materials are the solid materials removed from the bottom of water bodies for the
purpose of improving navigation. Dredged materials may include sand, silt, clay, rock, and pollutants from
municipal and industrial discharges. Id.
27 Lahey, supra note 6.
28 Id. (citing U. FORSTNER & G. WITTMAN, METAL POLLUTION IN THE AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT
(1977)).
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marine life and humans.29 As a result of marine pollution, the Food and
Drug Administration has closed approximately twenty percent of the
shellfish beds in the United States, 3 and many species of fish have been
depleted or rendered inedible.3'
2. Oxygen Depletion
Ocean pollution further affects marine life and the marine
environment through the process of oxygen depletion. Oxygen supports
aquatic life and is necessary for the biological degradation of organic
materials.32  Organic wastes, particularly sewage sludge, demand large
amounts of oxygen for decomposition. 33 Approximately 320,000 gallons of
air-saturated seawater are required to completely oxidize one gallon of crude
oil. 34  Because oxygen in waters near dumpsites is consumed in the
decomposition of wastes, these waters are often so depleted of oxygen that
they are unable to support marine organisms.3 5 The decomposition of
marine organisms that die due to insufficient oxygen further accelerates and
compounds the problem of oxygen depletion.36 When an area is depleted of
37oxygen, anaerobic bacteria produce hydrogen sulfide and methane gas.
Additionally, the accumulation of organic matter, sulfides, and some metals
can act as a reservoir of future oxygen demand, thereby perpetuating the
cycle of oxygen depletion in the waters near dumpsites.3 8
3. Habitat Changes
In addition to the immediate and direct effects of marine pollution,
habitat changes caused by ocean dumping may have a deleterious long-range
effect on the global ecosystem. Pollutants have varying effects on different
marine organisms and can deplete certain marine species. Changes in the
population of marine species can upset the ecological balance in the affected
29 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, THE ROLE OF THE OCEAN IN A
WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 56-61 (1981).
" ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCEAN
DUMPING PERMIT PROGRAM 7 (1973).
3' CEQ, supra note 7, at 17.
32 Id. at 14.
33 Id; Lumsdaine, supra note 14, at 757.
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areas. 39  Additionally, changes in the kinds and quantities of sediments
deposited in the ocean can alter ecosystems. 40 The plague of coral-eating
starfish in the Pacific Ocean, for example, is thought to be linked to
sediments resulting from blasting, dredging, and dumping.4' The sediments
protect larval starfish from predators that normally keep the starfish
population in balance.42
C. Development of Ocean Dumping Regulations
In response to the growing threat of marine pollution, President Nixon
instructed the United States Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") to
conduct a comprehensive investigation of the nature and magnitude of the
ocean dumping problem.43 The CEQ's 1970 report detailed the harms of
marine pollution and predicted massive increases in the level of ocean
dumping and widespread deterioration of marine environments. 44 The report
urged legislative action at both the national and international levels.
Domestic and international action is necessary if ocean
dumping is to be controlled. The United States must show its
concern by strong domestic action through implementation of
recommended policy. But unilateral action alone will not solve
a global problem. International controls, supported by global
monitoring and coordinated research, will be necessary to deal
effectively and comprehensively with pollution caused by
ocean dumping.45
In June of 1971, as a result of the CEQ report, the United States submitted a
draft convention on ocean dumping to the first session of the Inter-
Governmental Working Group on Marine Pollution.46 After numerous
39 See Lumsdaine, supra note 14, at 757 (citing WATER RESOURCES ENGINEERS, INC., ECOLOGIC
RESPONSES TO OCEAN WASTE DISCHARGES: RESULTS FROM SAN DIEGO'S MONITORING PROGRAM (1970)).
40 CEQ, supra note 7, at 15.
41 id.
42 id.
43 GR. J. TIMAGENIS, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE POLLUTION 110 (1980).
44 CEQ, supra note 7, at v.
41 Id. at 37.
46 Lawson A.W. Hunter, Background Paper: Prospects for an Ocean Dumping Convention, in
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL MARINE SCIENCE
AFFAIRS POLICY OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE QUESTION OF AN OCEAN DUMPING
CONVENTION: CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP ON AN OCEAN DUMPING CONVENTION 7, 10-13
(1972).
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negotiations,47 the final text of the Convention was adopted in London on
November 13, 1972.48 The Convention entered force on August 30, 1975 .
Currently, seventy-seven nations have signed the Convention.
50
D. London Convention: The Basic Provisions
Parties to the Convention pledge to take all practicable steps to
prevent marine pollution caused by the dumping of wastes that could have
deleterious effects on human life and marine life.51 They further agree to
harmonize their dumping policies and, within their scientific, technical and
economic capabilities, take individual action to prevent marine pollution
caused by dumping.52
More specifically, parties to the Convention agree to prohibit the
dumping of certain hazardous materials and to require that a special permit
be obtained before other general classes of potentially harmful wastes can be
dumped into the ocean.5 3 Prohibited materials are listed in Annex I of the
Convention and include high-level radioactive wastes, oil taken on board for
the purpose of dumping, materials in whatever form (e.g., solids, liquids,
gases) produced for biological and chemical warfare products, and materials
containing mercury or cadmium.54  The dumping of Annex I materials is
strictly prohibited unless the substance is "rapidly rendered harmless by
physical, chemical or biological processes in the sea, provided it does not (1)
make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or (2) endanger human health or
that of domestic animals. 55 Special permit materials are listed in Annex II
and include low-level radioactive wastes, heavy containers and scrap metal
that are likely to sink to the sea bottom and present a serious obstacle to
fishing or navigation, and substances that contain any of a variety of
chemicals or their compounds in "significant" quantities.56 A general permit
47 Negotiations took place in Ottawa, Canada in November 1971, Reykajavik, Iceland in April 1972,
and London, England in May 1972. Id. at 7-8.
48 id.
49 International Maritime Organization, Summary of Status of Conventions as of 30 June 1999
(visited Aug. 16, 1999) <http://www.imo.org/imo/convent/summary.htm> [hereinafter Status of
Conventions].
50 Id.
5I London Convention, supra note 8, art. I.
52 Id. art. II.
s Id. art. IV.
54 Id. annex 1.
55 Id.
s6 Id. annex 11.
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is required before other wastes or matter not specified in Annex I or II can
be dumped.
57
The Convention specifies two emergency exceptions under which the
dumping prohibitions may be suspended. The first, known as the "safety at
sea exception," applies when the failure to dump would endanger the safety
of human lives or vessels at sea.58 The second, known as the "emergency
exception," applies when an emergency poses an unacceptable risk to human
health.59 Many nations objected to the idea of emergency exceptions to the
dumping prohibitions. A small negotiating and drafting group was
established to discuss differences among the nations, but the group was
unable to work out a viable solution. 61 The exceptions were ultimately
included in the Convention along with a waiver clause. Article V(3) allows
Contracting Parties to waive their rights under the emergency clause at the
time of, or subsequent to, ratification or accession to the Convention.
62
III. EMERGENCY SITUATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION
A. The Safety at Sea Exception
All dumping prohibitions are suspended when dumping is necessary
to secure the safety of human lives or vessels at sea (1) in cases of force
majeure caused by stress of weather, or (2) if dumping appears to be the
only way to avert the threat and there is every probability that the damage
resulting from such dumping will be less than would otherwise occur.63 This
exception is typically known as the "safety at sea exception." Dumping
done under this exception does not require a permit, but must be reported to
the current organization for the London Convention ("the Organization").
64
The Organization is designated by the Contracting Parties and is responsible
57 Id. art. IV(c).
Id. art. V(2).
59Id. art. V(2).
60 The safety at sea exception was opposed at the 1972 Conference in a recorded statement by the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the U.S.S.R. The
emergency exception, originally proposed by the United States, was opposed by most coastal and
developing countries. Argentina and Mexico presented their reservations in writing and Chile, Spain, and
Portugal asked to have their oral reservations recorded in a conference document. TIMAGENIS, supra note
43, at 223-25
61 id.
62 Id.; INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, THE LONDON DUMPING CONVENTION: THE FIRST
DECADE AND BEYOND 79 (1991) [hereinafter THE FIRST DECADE].
63 London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(I).
64Id.
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for secretariat duties65 in relation to the Convention.66 The International
Maritime Organization ("IMO") is the current Organization for the London
Convention.67
The provisions for force majeure and securing vessels under the safety
at sea exception were later additions to an earlier draft which stated, "[t]he
provisions of Article IV shall not apply where the safety of human life is
threatened. 68 While including these additions in the final version, however,
the drafters of the Convention neither defined a force majeure situation nor
clarified what was meant by "necessary to secure the safety of vessels."
B. Unacceptable Risks to Human Health: The Emergency Exception
Situations that do not qualify under the safety at sea exception, but
nevertheless pose an unacceptable risk to human health, may be excepted
from the Convention's dumping prohibitions with an emergency permit.
This exception is typically referred to as the "emergency exception." An
emergency permit may be issued if (1) there is an unacceptable risk to
human health, (2) there is "no other feasible solution," and (3) the
Contracting Party issuing the emergency permit has consulted with the
Organization and with other countries that may be affected by the
dumping.69  The Contracting Party must follow the Organization's
recommendations "to the maximum extent feasible" and must inform the
Organization of any action subsequently taken.70
Although the emergency exception is technically applicable to
emergency situations on land and at sea, the IMO has interpreted the "main
thrust of Article V(2) [as regulating] exceptional problems with wastes or
other matter on land involving black-list substances only.' Situations on
land that have resulted in ocean dumping under the emergency exception
65 Secretariat duties include: (1) the convening of consultative meetings of the Contracting Parties
not less frequently than once every two years and of special meetings of the Parties at any time on the
request of two thirds of the Parties; (2) preparing and assisting, in consultation with the Contracting Parties
and appropriate international organizations, in the development and implementation of procedures; (3)
considering inquiries by, and information from, the Contracting Parties, and (4) consulting with the
Contracting Parties, and providing recommendations to the Parties on questions related to, but not
specifically covered by, the Convention. London Convention, supra note 8, art. XIV(3).
6 Id. art. XIV(2).
67 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 62, at 37.
68 Hunter, supra note 46, at 46.
69 London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2).
70 Id.
71 Interpretation of the "Force Majeure " and "Emergencies" Exceptions Under Article V of the
Convention 1972, IMO LC.2/Circ. 343 5.1 (Oct. 25, 1994) (hereinafter IMO Circular].
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include the disposal of chemical ammunition 72 and the disposal of residues
and rubble left over from the explosion of a chemical plant.73
Situations at sea that have resulted in ocean dumping under the
emergency exception have involved ships that became wrecks after
collisions and/or fires.74 Ships that have been involved in such emergencies
have included the Hatsue Maru # 55, which caught fire off of Canada;7 5 the
Anyo Maru, which caught fire off the coast of Greenland; 76 and the Wishing
Star, which caught fire after a collision near the beaches of Puerto Rico.77
Most recently, the United States issued an emergency permit for the disposal
of an ice pier off Antarctica. The underside of the pier had eroded and the
structure had developed internal cracks that could not be repaired.79  The
unloading of heavy materials onto the pier posed a substantial and
unacceptable hazard to human life.80 The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") determined that no options other than dumping were available and
that an emergency permit was necessary in order to tow the deteriorating
pier and dump it in McMurdo Sound before the harbor and sound froze.8'
The Convention leaves assessment of whether there is "risk to human
health" and "no other feasible solution" to each individual nation.
Recognizing the lack of criteria and procedures for determining an
emergency, however, the First Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties
adopted Interim Procedures and Criteria ("Interim Procedures") that should
be considered in emergency situations.82 Under the Interim Procedures,
Contracting Parties should first assess the risk to human health by
considering (1) the circumstances of the emergency, including the chemical
composition of material involved, the location and cause of release, the
72 Denmark notified the IMO following the issuance of a special permit in June 1977 and requested
information on the safe handling of World War II chemical ammunition which had been dumped in 1947
and 1948 in the Baltic Sea. The ammunition had been and still is regularly caught in the nets of Danish
fishermen and sometimes causes personal injury. Id. annex (2).
73 Following the explosion of a chemical plant in Seveso on July 10, 1976, Italy requested advice
concerning international procedures that may be followed in disposing of material contaminated by TCDD
(Dioxins). See id. annex (13).
74 Id. at 5.3.2(B).
75 Id. annex (3.1).
76 Id. at 10.
77 Id. at 11.
78 Issuance of an Emergency Ocean Dumping Permit to the National Science Foundation for
Disposal of an Ice Pier From its Base at McMurdo Station, Antarctica, 64 Fed. Reg. 5790 (1999).
'9 Id. at 5791.
80 Id. It is unclear whether the ice pier itself was a danger to human life or if it was just the use of
the pier that made it unsafe. The Convention does not explicitly cover the latter scenario. However, its text
is broad enough that the situation may be read into the exception.
"' Id. at 5792.
82 THE FIRsT DECADE, supra note 62, at 80.
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amount lost into the environment, the potential for further release, and the
expected rate of further releases; and (2) the risks relating to human health,
including the toxicity of the material to human life, the method of contact,
and the impact of dumping on the health of present and future generations.
83
The Contracting Parties further found that the feasibility of disposal at sea
should only be considered after alternative methods of disposal have been
evaluated.84  Such evaluations should take into account the costs, the
assessment of environmental impact of each alternative, and the designation
and monitoring of the disposal site.
8 5
Though helpful, the Interim Procedures are merely recommendations,
and the final weighing of factors and decisions is left to individual nations.
As such, the terms and conditions of the emergency exception continue to
allow for varying interpretations. Additionally, although the third element
of the emergency exception requires consultation with other countries and
the Organization, the final decision on whether to dump is made by the
individual nation, and recommendations need only be followed to the extent
"feasible," a term left undefined and open to interpretation.
C. Enforcement
The duty to ensure compliance with the Convention is delegated to
each Contracting Party. Specifically, the Convention provides that the state
where the vessel is registered ("flag state"), the state where the waste was
loaded ("port state"), or the state having jurisdiction over the area where the
86dumping occurred ("coastal state") shall apply enforcement measures. In
addition, each Contracting Party is required to prevent and punish conduct
87that violates the Convention. There are, however, no provisions for
international sanctions in the event a state dumps prohibited substances
either in direct disregard of the Convention or in a situation that does not fall
under the emergency provisions. The lack of any international enforcement
mechanism leaves open the possibility that there will be differences in the
" Id. at 156-57.
84Id.
85 Id.
86 London Convention, supra note 8, art. VII(1); see also James McCullagh, Russian Dumping of
Radioactive Wastes in the Sea of Japan: An Opportunity to Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Convention
1972, 5 PAC. RIM. L. & POL' J. 399, 409 (1996).
87 London Convention, supra note 8, art. VII(2).
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degree of vigilance Contracting Parties will exhibit in the monitoring and
sanctioning of violators.
88
The Convention encourages states with a common interest in particular
geographical areas to enter into regional agreements to supplement the
Convention. 89  Although Contracting Parties are free to implement binding
enforcement mechanisms on regional levels, there are currently no regional
agreements in the North Pacific region.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PACIFIC RIM REGION
In the Pacific Rim region, the United States, Canada, Japan, China, and
the Philippines have all signed the Convention.9" Thus, the North Pacific 91 and
the countries bordering the North Pacific are in theory protected from ocean
dumping. However, the ambiguous emergency provisions and the lack of
enforcement provisions provide a loophole for unregulated dumping that could
threaten nations sharing common seas. This is particularly true in the North
Pacific, where some countries, such as Japan and the Philippines, are in close
proximity to other nations. In both Japan and the Philippines, domestic laws
implementing the Convention retain the ambiguous wording of the
Convention. In Japan, the Law Concerning Prevention of Marine Pollution
and Marine Disasters92 provides:
No person shall discharge wastes from a ship on the sea area.
Provided that, this shall not apply to the discharge of wastes
falling under any of the following: (1) The discharge of wastes
for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving human
life; (2) The discharge of wastes when wastes were discharged
due to damage to the ship or by other unavoidable cause and all
the possible measures to prevent the continuous discharge of
wastes were taken.
93
88 See, e.g., Legislative Developments: Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping Wastes and Other Matter, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 575, 582 (1974) [hereinafter Legislative
Developments].
o9 London Convention, supra note 8, art. Vill.
90 See Status of Conventions, supra note 49.
91 For the purposes of this Comment, the North Pacific is the portion of the Pacific Ocean above the
equator.
92 Kaiyo Osen Oyobi Kaijo Saigai no Boshi ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning Prevention of
Marine Pollution and Marine Disasters], translated in 7 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES YE (1970).
9' Id. art. 10(l)-(2).
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Similarly, the Philippines Presidential Decree No. 979 provides:
Except in cases of emergency imperiling life or property, or
unavoidable accident, collision, or stranding or in any cases
which constitute danger to human life or property or a real threat
to vessels, aircraft, platforms, or other man-made structure [sic],
or if dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat
and if there is probability that the damage consequent upon such
dumping will be less than would otherwise occur, it shall be
unlawful to [dump wastes in navigable waters.] 94
Although neither Japan nor the Philippines has notified the IMO of any
dumping under the emergency provisions, the ambiguous provisions and the
ability of states to declare an emergency situation at their own discretion poses
a continuous threat to neighboring nations.
On the eastern side of the North Pacific, unregulated dumping by
Canada and the United States poses similar threats. Canada has twice notified
the IMO of decisions to sink vessels under the emergency provisions, 95 and the
United States has notified the IMO four times.96 Although only one dumping
(that of the Hatsue Maru # 55, a Japanese-registered vessel that caught fire off
the west coast of Canada) occurred in the North Pacific, the frequency and
discretion with which Canada and the United States have used the emergency
provisions are a threat to the Pacific Ocean and the countries that border it.
V. THE NEW CARISSA AND THE APPLICATION OF THE EMERGENCY
EXCEPTIONS
A. Summary of Events Leading to the Dumping of the New Carissa
The New Carissa, a 639-foot cargo ship en route from Japan to
Oregon, ran aground one mile north of Coos Bay on the morning of
'4 Presidential Decree No.979, available in The Law Firm of Chan Robles & Associates Homepage
(visited May 8, 1999) <http://members.xoom.com/_XOOM/chanroblesO/PD979.htm#PD979>.
95 On December 26, 1978, Canada sunk the trawler Hatsue Maru # 55 after it caught fire off the west
coast of Canada. See IMO Circular, supra note 71, annex (3.1). On April 1, 1979, Canada sunk the bow of
the tanker Kurdistan after it struck ice in the Cabot Strait. Id. annex (3.2).
96 On April 28, 1976, the United States dumped 90% of the cargo of the barge Sparkling Waters after
it was involved in a collision. On December 16, 1988, the United States sunk the Wishing Star after it
caught fire in a collision. Id. at 1. In February 1999, the United States dumped the ice pier in McMurdo
Sound. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. In March, the United States dumped the New
Carissa. See infra Part V.A.
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February 4, 1999.97 The ship was carrying 359,000 gallons of bunker oil
used to fuel the ship's engines and 37,400 gallons of diesel fuel used to run
the electric generators. 98 After the New Carissa ran aground, the twenty-
three member crew was safely removed from the freighter and a Unified
Command was formed to coordinate response efforts. The Unified
Command was headed by the United States Coast Guard and included the
ship's owner and a representative from the Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality. 99
The Unified Command called a salvage tug to pull the ship off the
beach. While waiting for the tug to arrive, however, the ship began leaking
fuel from two oil tanks and ultimately released approximately 70,000 gallons
of oil into the ocean.100 The Unified Command made a joint decision to
burn off as much of the oil as practicable. Approximately 200,000 gallons
of fuel were burned in this operation, l0 ' but during the bum the vessel broke
in half. An attempt was made to pump some of the remaining 130,000
gallons of fuel from the vessel, but due to the viscosity of the fuel, the
operation was unsuccessful. 10 2 In light of expected severe weather and sea
conditions, the Unified Command concluded that the New Carissa would
likely suffer catastrophic structural failure and would release significant
quantities of oil into the ocean. 10 3  The Unified Command made a joint
decision to tow the bow of the New Carissa 280 miles west into
international waters and sink it in water approximately 10,000 
feet deep.'0 4
B. Did the Dumping of the New Carissa Violate the London Convention?
The United States ratified the London Convention on April 29,
1974.'05 Thus, when the Convention entered force on August 30, 1975, it
became binding upon the United States.106 The dumping of the bow of the
97 Joint Information Center, Release #2 from Coos Bay, Press Release No. 002.990204 (Feb. 4,
1999) (on file with author); Malek & Vogt, supra note 1.
98 Malek & Vogt, supra note 1.
99 Id.
1oo New Carissa Chronology, OREGONIAN (Mar. 4, 1999); United States Coast Guard, Regional
Response Team Region X/Northwest Area Committee Meeting Minutes (Mar. 8, 1999)
<http://www.uscg.mil/dl3/m/rrtl.htm> [hereinafter RRTMinutes].
1o1 RRT Minutes, supra note 100.
102 Id.
103 Office of Response and Restoration, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Wreck Removal and Scuttling: Unified Command Decision Memo (April 20, 1999)
<http://l 61.55.32.17:59 l/carissa/ucdoc3.htm> [hereinafter Decision Memo].
104 RRT Minutes, supra note 100, at 1; Malek & Vogt, supra note 1, at 2.
105 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 62, at 132.
106 ld.
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New Carissa, with its 130,00 gallons of fuel, was therefore subject to the
London Convention.
Under Annex I of the Convention, the dumping of crude oil and its
wastes, refined petroleum products, and petroleum are strictly prohibited
unless these substances are "rapidly rendered harmless."'' 0 7 If the substances
are "rapidly rendered harmless," they may be dumped by special or general
permit. 10 8 Under the guidelines presented in Resolution LDC 24(10) of the
Convention, substances may be regarded as "rapidly rendered harmless" if
tests of the waste or other matter proposed for dumping,
including tests on the persistence of the material, show that the
substances can be dumped so as not to cause acute or chronic
toxic effects or bioaccumulation in sensitive marine organisms
typical of the marine ecosystem at the disposal site. 109
Although the Unified Command thought the oil would not leak from the
bow of the New Carissa,110 no tests were actually performed to confirm
whether the oil on board would be "rapidly rendered harmless" at the
disposal site. Furthermore, no permits were issued for the dumping of the
New Carissa.
The dumping of the New Carissa would have to have fallen under one
of the emergency exceptions in order to have been permissible under the
Convention. 1 Because the text of the Convention is ambiguous and leaves
the interpretation of the provisions to individual nations, the United States
could argue that the dumping of the New Carissa qualified under an
emergency exception. Under a strict reading of the Convention, however,
the dumping was a violation. Although the lack of international
enforcement makes the legality of the dumping inconsequential, application
of the Convention to the dumping of the New Carissa illustrates several
weaknesses of the Convention that could have serious international
implications.
'07 London Convention, supra note 8, annex I.
'08 THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 62, at 161.
'0' Id. at 162.
110 Press Release 86, supra note 13. Bill Milwee, a member of the Unified Command and a salvage
expert with Gallagher Marine Systems said, "The crew on the U.S.S. David R. Ray have indicated that the
New Carissa sank by the stem. That provides the best assurance that the remaining oil will be trapped
onboard. We also expect that the very cold ocean temperatures will help trap the oil in the fuel tanks." Id.
1 See discussion supra Part ILA-B.
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1. The Safety at Sea Exception
The dumping of the New Carissa should not fall within the safety at
sea exception because dumping was not necessary to secure the safety of
human lives or the vessel at sea. Moreover, even if lives or the vessel had
been threatened, the dumping would have to have involved additional factors
in order to have qualified under this exception. To qualify under the safety
at sea exception, dumping must either be (1) necessary due to force majeure
caused by stress of weather,' 2 or (2) the only way to avert a threat to human
lives or vessels. In situations involving the second factor, dumping must
cause less damage than would otherwise occur.113 Neither qualification is
clearly defined, but under a strict reading of the Convention, the dumping of
the New Carissa did not meet either qualification.
a. Securing the safety of human life and vessels at sea
The safety at sea exception applies when it is necessary to secure the
safety of human lives or vessels at sea.' 4 In the case of the New Carissa,
the crew of twenty-three had already been removed from the freighter when
it was dumped.' 1 5 Thus, human lives at sea were not threatened.
Furthermore, the vessel was ultimately dumped into the ocean. Therefore,
dumping was not necessary to secure the vessel. The purpose of dumping
was to prevent further release of oil, not to secure the safety of human lives
at sea or to secure the safety of the vessel.
It could be argued that release of oil would, over time, threaten human
lives on land, as the exception is ambiguous as to whether the human lives
threatened may be lives at land as well as those at sea.' 1 6 This ambiguity
was discussed during the drafting of the Convention. The relevant report of
the Sea-Bed Committee stated, "Attention was . . . drawn . . . to the
exemption contained in Article V which was thought to need some
clarification. It was suggested that the human lives to be safeguarded in this
draft article should be those aboard ships, platforms, and aircraft."'1 7 The
112 London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(1).
113 Id.
1"4 Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1415(h) (1994).
" 5 The crew of the New Carissa was removed from the vessel on February 4, 1999. See Malek &
Vogt, supra note 1.
116 Article V(l) states, "The provisions of Article IV shall not apply when it is necessary to secure the
safety of human life or of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea . London
Convention, supra note 8, art. V(I).
117 TIMAGENIS, supra note 43, at 222 (citing U.N. Doc. AIAC.138/84 12-13).
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final text does not draw any distinction, however, so the provision remains
ambiguous.
The safety at sea exception should be interpreted narrowly for several
reasons. First, Article V(2) of the Convention provides for emergencies
where there is an unacceptable risk to human health generally. This suggests
that Article V(1) should be interpreted narrowly to apply only when lives at
sea are threatened. Second, in a 1994 circular on the interpretation of Article
V of the Convention, the IMO stated, "there is agreement that Article V(1)
solely applies to situations involving ships etc. in distress at sea."
' 18
Although this circular does not specifically address the issue of whether
securing the safety of human lives includes lives on land, the interpretation
indicates that Article V(1) only applies to situations in which human lives at
sea are threatened. Finally, because the safety at sea exception allows
dumping without a permit, the provision should be narrowly construed to
prevent the unregulated dumping of prohibited substances. Because the
dumping of the New Carissa was not necessary to secure the safety of
human lives or the vessel at sea, the safety at sea exception should not apply
to this case.
b. Force majeure caused by stress of weather
If the dumping of the New Carissa were found to fall within the safety
at sea exception, the situation would still have to have involved one of two
factors. The first is force majeure caused by stress of weather." 9 The
Convention neither defines force majeure nor specifies what situations
constitute events of force majeure. Typically, events of force majeure are
defined as events not within the reasonable control of the party affected and
which, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, the party is unable to
prevent or avoid. 20 Because the Convention specifies that force majeure
must be caused by stress of weather, the exception covers only situations
that could not have been prevented or avoided due to unforeseeably severe
weather conditions. Although the New Carissa was caught in stormy
weather with winds of twenty-five to thirty knots and swells of twenty feet,
it is questionable whether these conditions were severe enough and
unforeseeable enough to have constituted an event offorce majeure.
118 IMO Circular, supra note 71, at 2.5 (emphasis added).
1 I London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(I).
'20 Edward D. McCutcheon, Think Globally, Act Locally: Promoting Effective National
Environmental Regulatory Infrastructures in Developing Nations, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 395, 416 (1998).
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c. Dumping necessary to avert a threat and minimize damage
If an emergency does not involve force majeure, the safety at sea
exception only applies if dumping is the only way to avert a threat to human
lives or vessels and there is every probability that the damage caused by
dumping will be less than would otherwise occur. 21 In the case of the New
Carissa, it is questionable whether there was any threat to human lives or
vessels. 122 Furthermore, even if there was such a threat, dumping was not
the only way to avert it. The Unified Command considered a number of
alternatives and ultimately decided dumping would be the best way to
prevent oil from leaking.123  The command decision memo noted,
"numerous lightering proposals were considered. In each case, removal of
the oil from the vessel [was] a less effective or unsafe alternative.",12
4
Because there were alternative methods to avert the threat of oil leakage,
dumping was not the only way to avert the threat. Thus, even though the
Unified Command decided dumping was the most effective alternative, the
second qualification required for the safety at sea exception was not met.
2. Emergency Exception
If a dumping does not qualify under the safety at sea exception, it may
still be permissible if an emergency permit is issued.1 25 In the United States,
the EPA is the administrative body authorized to issue emergency permits.
26
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act ("MPRSA"),127 which
implemented the Convention in the United States, states:
[The] Administrator [of the EPA] may issue emergency permits
... for the dumping of industrial waste into ocean waters.., if
the Administrator determines that there has been demonstrated
to exist an emergency, requiring the dumping of such waste,
which poses an unacceptable risk relating to human health and
admits of no other feasible solution. 1
28
121 London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(1).
2 See discussion supra Part V.B.1.a.
123 Decision Memo, supra note 103, at 1-2.
124 Id. at 1.
125 London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2).
126 33 U.S.C. §§ 1402, 1412(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
2 d. §§ 1401-45.
I28 d. § 1412(a).
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In the case of the New Carissa, however, the EPA did not consider
issuing an emergency permit. When consulted, the EPA Region 10 ocean
dumping coordinator stated, "so long as the situation continued as an
emergency, no permitting [was] required."' 129  Because the "emergency"
took place in marine waters, the EPA deferred to the United States Coast
Guard. 130 The Coast Guard subsequently found authority to dump the New
Carissa under the National Contingency Plan ("NCP") authorized by the
Clean Water Act.' 31  Under the NCP, if "the lead agency makes the
determination ... that there is a threat to public health or welfare of the
United States or the environment, the lead agency may take any appropriate
removal action to abate, prevent, minimize, stabilize, mitigate, or eliminate
the release or the threat of release."'
132
Although the statute appears to confer unlimited authority on lead
agencies, 33 an "appropriate removal action" may not violate international
law. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in a similar case
in which the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a domestic statute, could have
been construed to nullify foreign arbitration clauses. The Court found that
"[i]f the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international
accords and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its
courts should be most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in
such manner as to violate international agreements."'
134
Under the Convention, dumping prohibitions may not be suspended
when there is a threat to the environment unaccompanied by a threat to
human lives or vessels at sea. Moreover, prohibited substances may not be
dumped unless one of the two emergency exceptions apply. Contrary to the
EPA's determination, if the emergency does not meet the requirements of
the safety at sea exception, an emergency permit must be issued for the
dumping of substances otherwise prohibited under Annex I of the
Convention.
Had the EPA considered issuing an emergency permit, it is unlikely
that a permit for dumping the New Carissa could have been properly issued
under the Convention. Under both the MPRSA and the Convention, an
129 Memorandum from John Malek, Ocean Dumping Coordinator Sediment Management Program, to
Environmental Protection Agency Region 10 File 2 (Feb. 10, 1999) (on file with author); Decision Memo,
supra note 103, at 2.
130 Id.; Telephone Interview with John Malek, EPA Region 10 Ocean Dumping Coordinator (May 13,
1999) [hereinafter Malek].
13 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(B)(iii) (West 1994 & Supp. 111996)
32 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(1) (1998) (emphasis added).
133 Authority is found in 33 U.S.C. § 1321 and is delegated to the federal on-scene coordinator by the
NCP.
134 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
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emergency permit may only be issued if there is an unacceptable risk to
human health and no other feasible solution exists.1 35 Though the Interim
Procedures 36 provide some guidance, the definition of both "unacceptable
risk to human health" and "no other feasible solution" remains nebulous. If
the exceptions are narrowly construed, the dumping of the New Carissa
would not fall under the emergency exception.
a. Unacceptable risk to human health
In order to qualify under the emergency exception in Article V(2) of
the Convention, a situation must pose an unacceptable risk to human
health. 137 The Interim Procedures provide a list of factors to consider in
assessing the risk to human health, but do not state explicitly which
situations constitute "unacceptable risk[s]." Because the weighing of factors
and the ultimate determination of an unacceptable risk is left to individual
nations, the United States could have decided that the New Carissa posed an
unacceptable risk to human health. Under a strict reading of Article V(2) of
the Convention, however, the New Carissa did not meet the "unacceptable
risk" requirement. As with ocean dumping and other forms of marine
pollution, the release of oil from the New Carissa posed some risk to human
health. However, the New Carissa only presented indirect human health
risks such as contamination of the food chain and the water supply. In this
case, the direct threat was to the environment. The Unified Command
decision memo justifying the dumping of the New Carissa stated:
We continue to have major concerns for wildlife and associated
habitats. The continued release of oil, or the industrial
operation required to remedy the oil impact, would have a
devastating impact throughout the response area . . . Wildlife
and their associated habitats on the Coos Bay north spit would
be significantly impacted through road construction and
overland wreck removal activities .... 138
Nowhere in the decision memo is there reference to human health risks,
much less an "unacceptable risk" to human health. Though the Convention
does not define an unacceptable human health risk and the Interim
"' London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1412(a).
136 See discussion supra Part III.B.
13' London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2).
138 Decision Memo, supra note 103, at 1.
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Procedures fail to specify which risks are "unacceptable," the risk should at
least be direct, if not imminent and severe. If the Convention were to
provide exceptions for situations that pose an indirect risk to human health,
dumping would merely substitute one environmental harm for another. It is
unlikely that the Convention meant to provide for such a solution,
particularly in light of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which provides, "in taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment, States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or
indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or transform one type
of pollution into another."'
139
b. No feasible solution
Even if the New Carissa were found to have posed an unacceptable
risk to human health, in order for the emergency exception to have applied,
no feasible alternative to dumping could have existed. 140  Again, the
Convention is vague as to what is meant by "feasible." Thus it is
questionable whether the dumping of the New Carissa was the only
"feasible" solution within the meaning of the Convention. The Unified
Command considered alternative lightering proposals but decided they were
less effective or unsafe. 14 1 It is not clear whether "less effective" is the
equivalent of "not feasible." Furthermore, the Interim Procedures suggest
that the cost and the environmental impact of each alternative should be
considered in determining whether feasible alternatives exist. 142 Although
the alternatives for removing the oil from the New Carissa may have been
more costly, removal would have substantially minimized the environmental
impact of dumping.
c. Consultation
In addition to requiring that a situation pose an unacceptable risk to
human health and that there be no feasible solution other than dumping,
both the EPA regulations promulgated pursuant to the MPRSA and the
Convention contain consultation requirements. The EPA regulations
require those making a decision on dumping to discuss with the
' Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122
art. 195 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1261 (1982).
140 London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2).
141 Decision Memo, supra note 103, at 1.
142 London Convention, supra note 8, annex VII; THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 62, at 156-57.
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Department of State whether there is a need to consult with other parties to
the Convention. 43 The Convention requires that countries proposing to
dump prohibited material consult with parties that may be affected and the
IMO before a permit for dumping is issued. 144 In the case of the New
Carissa, neither the affected party 145 nor the IMO was consulted during the
decisionmaking process.1
46
C. Weaknesses of the Convention Illustrated by the New Carissa
The case of the New Carissa illustrates several weaknesses of the
Convention. First, the emergency exceptions are broad and open to
varying interpretations. Although it is likely that the dumping of the New
Carissa violated the Convention, the emergency exceptions could be
interpreted loosely to justify the dumping. Allowing individual nations to
interpret the Convention's ambiguous provisions may result in wide
variations on dumping standards. Of greater concern, some nations may
interpret the ambiguity of the Convention's provisions as a license to
dump pollutants. The loopholes provided by the vague provisions are
further exacerbated by the lack of coordinated monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. In the absence of international monitoring and enforcement,
nations have less incentive to construe the provisions narrowly,
particularly when dumping is the less expensive alternative.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Clarification at the Global Level
The emergency exceptions of the Convention, as written, weaken and
undermine the complete prohibition on ocean dumping established in Article
IV(l). The Contracting Parties should develop and adopt definitions and
criteria to clarify (1) what conditions constitute force majeure under the
safety at sea exception, (2) what risks are "unacceptable risks" to human
health under the emergency exception, and (3) what criteria must be
considered before there is a determination that there is no feasible alternative
143 40 C.F.R. § 220.3 (c) (1998)
'" London Convention, supra note 8, art. V(2).
145 In this case, Canada was the only party that may have been affected. Though not consulted during
the decisionmaking process, Canada was informed of the Unified Command's decisions after calling the
United States to inquire about the situation. Malek, supra note 130.
146 The incident was reported to the IMO after the dumping had been completed. Id.
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to dumping. Additionally, the Contracting Parties should clarify whether the
safety at sea exception applies to situations involving threats to human lives
on land as well as sea. Finally, the Contracting Parties should consider
establishing an international mechanism to monitor and enforce the dumping
prohibitions. An international coast guard, for example, could probably
enforce greater compliance with the Convention.1
47
B. Regional Agreements
In addition, or as an alternative to clarification at the global level,
countries sharing bodies of water should enter into regional agreements that
supplement the Convention. Regional agreements1 48 sidestep the problem of
seventy-seven nations agreeing on definitions and provide a mechanism
through which countries sharing a body of water can create appropriate and
effective solutions to protect the area from marine pollution. Regional
agreements allow flexibility and permit countries to account for the unique
geographical concerns of each region. Neighboring countries should use
regional agreements to clarify the ambiguities of the emergency provisions
and to implement binding enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.
The South Pacific region's Convention for the Protection of the
Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region ("Noumea
Convention") 149 and the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating
Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region,150 signed together in
1986, are examples of such regional agreements. These agreements call for
the establishment of reporting requirements, research and monitoring
programs, response measures, and mutual assistance in combating pollution
emergencies.15' Furthermore, the Noumea Convention establishes a regional
organization, the South Pacific Commission, to oversee its implementation
and the implementation of accompanying protocols.152 As one commentator
suggested:
147 Legislative Developments, supra note 88, at 582.
148 Regional agreements are provided for in Article ViII of the Convention. London Convention,
supra note 8, art. ViII.
149 South Pacific Region: Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region (1986), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987).
150 Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific
Region (1986), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 38, 59 (1987) [hereinafter Emergency Protocol].
15I See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice: Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 155, 158 (1991).
152 Id.
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The Convention and Protocols [of the Noumea Convention] are
. . . major step[s] forward both with regard to protecting the
environment of the South Pacific and to U.S. relations with the
states concerned. The Convention bridges differences between
the island states ... and other states with strategic interests in
the region. It is designed to reduce tensions by creating a legal
framework and institutional arrangements for mutual assistance
and cooperation, scientific projects, and information
exchange.'
53
Although the Noumea Convention retains the London Convention's
ambiguous emergency provisions,' 54 it represents a first step toward greaterregional protection of the marine environment.
C. The Precautionary Principle and Restrictive Readings
Whether clarification of the emergency provisions takes place at the
global or regional level, the emergency provisions should be read
restrictively in light of the precautionary principle and purpose of the
Convention. The precautionary principle is a preventative environmental
policy that requires the reduction and Prevention of environmental impacts
before the threshold of risk is reached.' 5 The precautionary principle rejects
historically accepted assumptions that science can ascertain and accurately
determine the assimilative capacity of the environment and that, once
determined, sufficient time will remain for preventative action. 1
56
The CEQ's report on ocean dumping that initiated the development of
the Convention' 57 recognized and embraced the precautionary principle.
The report's summary of findings and recommendations concluded:
The Nation has an opportunity unique in history-the
opportunity to act to prevent an environmental problem which
otherwise will grow to a great magnitude. In the past, we have
failed to recognize problems and to take corrective action
I5 d. at 156.
154 The Noumea Convention's emergency provisions parallel those of the London Convention. See
Leich, supra note 151, at 159.
' James Waczewski, Legal, Political, and Scientific Response to Ocean Dumping and Sub-Seabed
Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 97, 106 (1997).
156 Fullem, supra note 21, at 498 (quoting Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental
Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 303, 305 (1992)).
157 See discussion supra Part lI.C.
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before they became serious. The resulting signs of
environmental degradation are all around us, and remedial
actions heavily tax our resources.'
58
The Convention may also have been influenced by the precautionary
principle when the delegates voted to continue an indefinite suspension of
radioactive waste dumping in 1985, even though an expert study on the
dangers of radioactive waste dumping was inconclusive. 59  In addition,
Resolution LDC 44(14) provides for preventative actions when substances
introduced into the marine environment are likely to cause harm, even if
there is "no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relationship between
inputs and their effects."' 60  In light of the precautionary principle
underlying the purpose and policies of the Convention, the emergency
provisions should be read narrowly to prevent the unregulated dumping of
substances harmful to the marine environment.
Some critics caution against the use of the precautionary approach and
argue that, in the case of ocean dumping, there may be a safer disposal
method that has yet to be realized or developed.' 6' However, waiting for
such an alternative to be developed could result in severe and irreparable
harm to the environment. As one commentator wrote, "given scientific
ignorance, prudent pessimism should be favoured over hazardous
optimism. ' ' 162 Although no approach to the problem of waste disposal is
perfect, the precautionary approach at least errs on the side of preserving the
environment rather than polluting it.
VII. CONCLUSION
The London Convention represents a global consciousness of the
dangers presented by marine pollution. However, consciousness alone
cannot create preventative actions that preserve the marine environment.
Parties to the Convention must commit to abide by the strict prohibitions of
the Convention in order for the Convention to stem the growing tide of
waste dumped into the oceans. Furthermore, loopholes through which
'58 CEQ, supra note 7, at viii.
:59 Waczewski, supra note 155, at 106.
60 WILLIAM T. BURKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 4-143 (1997) (quoting Resolution LDC 44
(14) Fourteenth Consultative Meeting LDC 14/16 25 November 1991)).
161. "[T]he parties to the Convention should.., keep all options for radwaste disposal open until a
truly permanent and safe disposal method is developed." McCullagh, supra note 86, at 425.
162 Fullem, supra note 21, at 497 (citing MICHAEL JACOBS, THE GREEN ECONOMY: ENVIRONMENT,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS OF THE FUTURE 100 (1991)).
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Contracting Parties can escape their international obligations must be
eliminated. Currently, the vague provisions in the safety at sea exception
and the emergency exception permit varying interpretations of when an
emergency exists and provide little guidance as to when an exception may
properly be invoked. In the case of the New Carissa, dumping was not
necessary to secure the safety of human lives or vessels at sea, the situation
did. not pose an immediate and imminent risk to human health, and
alternatives other than dumping were available. This case illustrates the
weaknesses of the emergency provisions. These problems are exacerbated
by the lack of international monitoring and enforcement of the Convention,
which allows states to declare the suspension of dumping prohibitions
without providing any justification.
Parties to the Convention should develop and adopt, either on a global
or regional level, definitions and criteria that clarify the language of the
emergency provisions. Furthermore, Contracting Parties should consider
creating an international mechanism to monitor and enforce the
Convention's prohibitions on ocean dumping. Clarifications should reflect
the Convention's precautionary policy and purpose in order to prevent
irreparable environmental damage. Though scientists have yet to fully
determine the environmental consequences of ocean dumping, failure to
curb dumping practices now will severely affect the global environment of
the future.
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